THE PROBLEM OF THE NON-JUSTICIABILITY OF RELIGIOUS DEFAMATIONS by Smith, Peter
  
 
241 
Denning Law Journal 2015 Vol 27 pp 241-257 
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE NON-JUSTICIABILITY 
OF RELIGIOUS DEFAMATIONS 
 
Peter Smith 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
English law has long held the principle that religions should be free 
from interference by the state in certain matters. The original 1215 edition 
of the Magna Carta proclaimed, as its first article, ―THAT WE HAVE 
GRANTED TO GOD, and by this present charter have confirmed for us 
and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and shall 
have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired.‖1  
This article was intended to protect the established Catholic Church 
from the powers of the state, specifically from interference in church 
elections by the executive in the form of the person of the monarch. The 
notion that religions were institutions with practices and beliefs that were 
outside the control of the state in certain respects was adopted by the 
common law and is found in modern times in the principle of non-
justiciability on the matter of religion in certain types of civil case.
2
  
In recent years, the position has been summarised as ―the courts will 
not attempt to rule upon doctrinal issues or intervene in the regulation or 
governance of religious groups.‖3   
 
                                                     

 Employed barrister, Carter-Ruck, 6 St Andrew Street, London, EC4A 3AE. 
1
 ‗English Translation of Magna Carta‘ (British Library)<www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation> accessed 7 July 2015. Specifically, 
the article protected the ‗freedom of the Church‘s elections‘: ‗This freedom we 
shall observe ourselves, and desire to be observed in good faith by our heirs in 
perpetuity.‘ This was reiterated in the final peroration at article 63: ‗IT IS 
ACCORDINGLY OUR WISH AND COMMAND that the English Church shall 
be free...‘ 
2
 Also known as the ‗―non-interference‖ principle‘: see Russell Sandberg, Law 
and Religion (CUP 2011) 74-76. It does not apply to the Church of England as 
the Established church: see Mark Hill, Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe, 
Religion and Law in the United Kingdom (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2014) 76. 
3
 Blake v Associated Newspapers Limited [2003] EWHC 1960 (QB) [5] (Eady J). 
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Religion…is not the business of government or of the secular 
courts…The starting point of the law is an essentially agnostic 
view of religious beliefs and a tolerant indulgence to religious and 
cultural diversity… It is not for a judge to weigh one religion 
against another. All are entitled to equal respect.
4
  
 
This non-interference has been described as both active, ―through the 
express grant and preservation of rights of self-determination, self-
governance and self-regulation‖, and passive, ―through non-interference 
on the part of organs of State such as national government local or 
regional government or the secular courts. In the United Kingdom there is 
no systematic provision made for autonomy of religious organizations 
and, in the main, a self-denying ordinance of neutrality may be said to 
predominate.‖5 
One area of law where the passive conception has been particularly 
adopted is in the law of defamation. This is, perhaps, surprising: many 
religions specifically proscribe libel and particularly slander as forms of 
wrongdoing. In the Bible, the Psalmist prays, ―Set a watch, O Lord, before 
my mouth; and a door round about my lips‖.6 The Book of Proverbs 
warns, ―He that utterth a slander, is a fool‖7 and ―Do not slander a slave to 
his master, or he will curse you and you will be found guilty.‖8 St 
Matthew records Jesus telling his listeners, ―But I tell you that every 
careless word that people speak, they shall give an accounting for it in the 
Day of Judgment.‖9  
 Despite these injunctions, English law, which has otherwise been 
so deeply rooted in Christian principle, does not reflect this prohibition 
when it comes to the matter of religion and libel, as it did until recently 
with blasphemy and as it does with defamation generally.
10
 This is partly 
                                                     
4
 Sulaiman v Juffali [2001] EWHC 556 (Fam) [47] (Munby J).  
5
 Doe, Religion and Law in the United Kingdom (n 2). 
6
 Psalms 143:3. 
7
 Proverbs 10:18. 
8
 Proverbs 30:10. 
9
 Matthew 12:36. 
10
 Blasphemy was long a common law and statutory offence which defied neat 
definition, see the Law Commission, Offences Against Religion and Public 
Worship (working paper 79 1981) 5-6:  ‗there is no one agreed definition of 
blasphemy and blasphemous libel‘ – but it is often characterised as the 
defamation of religion. Prosecutions for blasphemy became increasingly rare; the 
last by the Crown was in 1922 and the only other prosecution before the crime 
was abolished by Criminal Justice & Immigration Act 2008, s 79 was a private 
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the cultural product of the Reformation. The sectarian violence of the 
period gradually gave way to the acceptance of religious difference in the 
liberal state, which had neither the knowledge nor the desire to investigate 
the truth of what were ultimately profound differences in belief between 
Catholic, Anglican and Non-Conformist theology.
11
 How could a court 
decide when a Catholic labelled a Protestant a heretic, for instance, or 
when one Methodist described another as schismatic?  
When the courts did intervene, it was only because of the implied or 
explicit accusation of another wrong that accompanied a religious libel. It 
was, for instance, once an actionable libel to call a person a ―Papist‖ and 
allege that they went to Mass, because of the imputation of criminality 
and disloyalty that was implied by the accusation.
12
 Gradually, public 
opinion has changed and it is clearly no longer the case today that, in 
England, being Catholic carries the same implied sting in the minds of the 
public.
13
  
Defamation law applied to religion is unstable and, as both a cause 
and a symptom of the cultural shift towards freer speech, defamation law 
itself has also changed markedly in very recent years. The pendulum has 
swung away from the right to reputation and towards free expression with 
the coming into force of the Defamation Act 2013. This introduced the 
hurdle of proving a statement has caused or is likely to cause ―serious 
harm‖ to the reputation of the claimant.14 It has also reformulated some of 
the substantial defences to a claim for libel in the new statutory defences 
                                                                                                                        
prosecution in 1978. See the history of the crime in the House of Lords‘ 
judgments in Whitehouse v Lemon; Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd [1979] 2 WLR 
281 (HL). 
11
 Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 11) ch 2. Sandberg describes four phases in the 
historical development of religion and law: the ‗temporal-spiritual partnership‘ 
which followed the Norman Conquest; ‗the era of discrimination and tolerance‘ 
which resulted from the Reformation; the ‗epoch of toleration‘ which followed 
the Glorious Revolution; and ‗the current age of positive religious freedom‘ 
stemming from the 1998 Human Rights Act.   
12
 Row v Sir Thomas Clargis (1681) 83 ER 252.  
13
 Other common law jurisdictions, however, have a different culture against 
which to judge the imputation of a libel. In Chen Cheng v Central Christian 
Church [1999] 1 Sing LR 94 Sing (CA), it was held that calling a church a ‗cult‘ 
was defamatory because in Singapore the word was a pejorative one, meaning a 
religious group with teachings and practices that are abhorrent and harmful to 
society. See Richard Parkes and others, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2013) ch 2, fn 213.  
14
 On the background to the 2013 Act, see ch 1 of James Price QC and Felicity 
McMahon, Blackstone’s Guide to the Defamation Act 2013 (OUP 2013).  
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of truth, honest opinion and publication on matter of public interest, 
introduced new defences, and extended existing ones.
15
  
The UK Supreme Court decision in Shergill v Khaira presents a 
challenge to the principle of non-justiciability in the case of religious 
defamation.
16
 The application of the principle in the case of Blake v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd was ―not…correct‖.17 Courts should not 
decline jurisdiction on the grounds of religion, even if they raise questions 
of doctrine and ecclesiology, if the claim is grounded in a valid cause of 
action such as libel: ―the court will enter into questions of disputed 
doctrine if it is necessary to do so in reference to civil interests‖.18  
This decision ostensibly gives the court jurisdiction to decide deep 
questions of religion and opens to claimants the right to vindicate their 
reputation when previously such an action would have been denied to 
them. However, this boon for claimants may be countered by an extension 
of the defence of honest opinion for defendants, as the Supreme Court 
itself notes.
19
   
 
DEFAMATION ACTIONS IN RELIGIOUS CONTEXTS 
GENERALLY 
 
It has been suggested that there are four types of dispute that include a 
―religious dimension‖.20  
                                                     
15
 Formerly, the defences of justification, fair comment, and responsible 
journalism. New defences include protection for the operators of websites and for 
peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals. Extended defences 
include reports protected by privilege. See Blackstone’s Guide to the Defamation 
Act 2013, chs 3-9.  
16
 [2014] UKSC 33, hereafter ‗Khaira‘.  
17
 [2003] EWHC 1960 (QB).  
18
 Ibid [57].   
19
 ‗The problem that such defamation claims face, which will usually doom them 
to failure, is that they raise issues of religious opinion on which people may hold 
opposing views in good faith. The expression of such views without malice is 
likely to be protected by the defence of honest comment – what used, until Joseph 
v Spiller [2011] 1 AC 852, to be called fair comment.‘ ibid.  
20
 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‗How to Know the Truth: Accommodating 
Religious Belief in the Law of Libel‘ (hereafter, ‗Mullis and Scott‘) ch 8 in James 
Richardson and Francois Bellanger (eds), Legal Cases, New Religious 
Movements, and Minority Faiths (Ashgate 2010). Also available at LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Papers 9/2012: 
<www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2012-09_Scott.pdf> accessed 8 July 2015.  
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First, general criticism of religions which, if deemed offensive to 
followers of the religion, may be caught by group defamation or 
blasphemy laws. General criticism of a religion does not found an action 
for libel unless a particular follower can establish that the criticism applies 
to him, however.
21
 This is why it is not actionable as a tort for a priest to 
sue on the allegation that all Catholics are child-abusers, nor for an imam 
to bring a claim against the publisher because of the assertion that all 
Muslims are terrorists, although criminal law may apply.
22
  
Second specific allegations may be caught when made against 
particular individuals alleging that they have failed to meet prescribed 
standards or expectations of behaviour, e.g. that they have sinned against 
the religion. But individuals impugned in this way are perhaps more likely 
to use internal dispute resolutions than secular courts, in a bid to stay 
within the organisation.
23
  
There are two further sorts of religious dispute which have historically 
led to libel actions that invoke the secular law. These are when general 
criticisms are made of a religion coupled with specific, associated 
criticism of a particular person such that they can sue, or when criticism of 
the religion is made without a basis in religious doctrine. These forms are 
                                                     
21
 In English law, there must be specificity before a person, whether legal or 
natural, can bring a defamation action. On the need for sufficient reference to the 
claimant, see Orme v Associated Newspapers, The Times 4 February 1981 
(Comyn J). The judge held that an article about the Moonies was capable of 
referring to the leader in England of that new minority religion. In that case, the 
grave charges must have been capable of referring to the plaintiff if only because 
people might say that he must have known what went on. See Hardeep Singh, 
‗Religious Libel: Are the Courts the Right Place for Faith Disputes?‘ (hereafter, 
‗Religious Libel‘) 152-54, ch 9 in Legal Cases, New Religious Movements, and 
Minority Faiths, ibid; and Mullis and Scott (n 20) fn 9, 134.  
22
 An exceptional case is Ortenburg v Plamondon (1914) 24 Quebec KB 69, 
decided under the Civil Law of Quebec but referring to common law cases, the 
defendant, in a lecture delivered in the City of Quebec, violently assailed and 
abused the Jewish race, its religious doctrines and social practices, the object 
being to put the public of Quebec on guard against the Jews of Quebec, who 
numbered only 75 families in a total population of 80,000 souls. It was held that 
although not assailed individually, the plaintiff, being one of the ‗‗restricted 
collectivity‘‘ of the Jews of Quebec, was entitled to maintain an action of 
defamation against the defendant. See Gatley on Libel and Slander (n 13) 7.9-
7.10. 
23
 See Frank Otuo v The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Britain [2013] 
(unrep but available at <https://inforrm.wordpress.com/table-of-cases-2/> 
accessed 1 July 2015) (HHJ Moloney QC) for an example of where the expulsion 
of a Jehovah‘s Witness member triggered a libel claim.  
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distinguished from each other by asking ―whether or not the imputations 
at issue rest upon a doctrinal dispute‖.24  
There are many examples of allegations being made without a basis in 
religious doctrine, as noted above.
25
 It has been held defamatory to state 
of an archbishop of the Church of Ireland that he has attempted to convert 
a Catholic priest to Protestantism by an offer of £1,000 in cash and a 
living of £800 a year,
26
 or to state of a clergyman that he is guilty of 
immorality or drunkenness,
27
 or that he preaches sedition,
28
 lies,
29
 or that 
he knows less about his religion than an adolescent,
30
 or that he has used 
his pulpit to throw out personal invectives against a member of the 
congregation,
31
 or that he has juggled with the collections,
32
 or that he has 
desecrated a part of his church by turning it into a cooking department.
33
 
Indeed, the religious context of an accusation can be taken into account, 
even if the action is without a basis in religious in doctrine.
34
 
If the allegation is that a clergyman preached false doctrine, it will be 
defamatory if, in the circumstances, it imputed hypocrisy. But if the 
defendant belonged to a different church to the claimant and the churches 
                                                     
24
 Mullis and Scott (n 20) 141.  
25
 See Gatley on Libel and Slander (n 13) 2.40, from where the following 
examples are drawn. More recent examples include Sharma v Sharma [2014] 
EWHC 3349 involving allegations of criminality after the defendant was replaced 
by the claimant on the board of a national Hindu charity.   
26
 Archbishop of Tuam v Robeson (1828) 5 Bing 17. 
27
 Payne v Beaumorris (1661) 1 Lev 248; Evans v Gwyn (1844) 5 QB 844; 
Gallwey v Marshall (1853) 9 Exch 294; Stow v Gardner (1843) 6 Up Can QB 
(OS) 512; Steltzer v Domm [1932] 2 WWR 139. Words which, if directed against 
another would not be defamatory may be so if directed against a clergyman, 
because of the nature of the calling: Murphy v Harty, 393 P 2d 206 (Or 1964). 
28
 Cranden v Walden (1693) 3 Lev 17. 
29
 Phillips v Badley (1582) cited 4 Co Rep at 19a; Drake v Drake (1652) Style 
363. 
30
 Maidman v Jewish Publications (1960) 54 Cal 2d 643.  
31
 Edwards v Bell (1824) 1 Bing 403. 
32
 Curtis v Argus (1915) 155 NY S 813; Dr Sibthorp‘s Case (1628) W Jones 366. 
33
 Kelly v Sherlock (1866) LR 1 QB 686. 
34
 Maccaba v Lichtenstein [2004] EWHC 1580 (QB) [9] (Gray J). However, in 
another religious slander case albeit one under a different statutory regime, the 
claimant‘s declaration that she had been expelled from her religious congregation 
and had been unable to join another, was not actionable absent proof of special 
damage: Roberts v Roberts 16 (1864) 5 B&S 384. 
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are in disagreement about the doctrine, it will not be an actionable tort.
35
 
This key distinction is at the heart of the non-justiciability problem. 
 
THE KHAIRA LITIGATION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
 
Khaira was one of a number of suits (along with Baba Jeet v Singh
36
 
and Shergill v Purewal)
37
 that stemmed from the overspill of a dispute in 
India to the Sikh community in the UK.
38
 The underlying dispute 
concerned the declaration of a mahant, or religious superior of a dera 
(monastery) in the Punjab, known in proceedings as the First Holy Saint, 
that he was a living guru and so a religious leader of great importance to 
Sikhs. The order he founded, the Nirmal Kutia Johal, set up three 
gurdwaras in the UK, in Bradford, Birmingham and High Wycombe.  He 
died in 2001 and was succeeded in short order by the Second and then 
Third Holy Saint.
39
  
In Khaira, eight of the appellants contended that they had been validly 
appointed as trustees of the three gurdwaras by the Third Holy Saint. They 
sought declarations that this was done under the relevant trust deeds, 
which allowed the First Holy Saint ―and his successor‖ to remove and 
appoint trustees. The respondents, the original trustees of the gurdwaras, 
argued that the Third Holy Saint had no power to remove and appointed 
trustees of the gurdwaras. 
The judge at first instance dismissed the defendants‘ application for 
strike out on the grounds of non-justiciability, considering that the legal 
question of the construction of the deeds required ―not an establishment of 
the propriety or the validity of a process by which the [Third Holy Saint] 
may have succeeded to come to be regarded as holding the office of Holy 
Saint but whether, as a matter of fact, he has become sufficiently 
recognised as the holder of that office to be considered to be a person 
                                                     
35
 See Dod v Robinson (1648) Aleyn 63; Gatley on Libel and Slander (n 13) fn 
417.  
36
 [2010] EWHC 1294 (QB). AKA His Holiness Sant Bab Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj 
v (1) Eastern Media Group Limited (2) Hardeep Singh 
37
 [2010] EWHC 3610 (QB). 
38
 For a brief exposition of the Sikh community in the UK, see Singh ‗Religious 
Libel‘ (n 21) 157. Singh himself was a defendant (along with his publisher, the 
Sikh Times) in the libel case of Baba Jeet v Singh, when he was sued by the Third 
Holy Saint. He explains the background to the religious dispute at 158-165. 
39
 The background facts are set out in the Court of Appeal judgment Shergill v 
Khaira [2012] EWCA Civ 983 [28] – [36] (Mummery LJ), and in Khaira (n 16) 
[2] – [11].  
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described as having a particular power in the English deed, the 
construction of which is before the court [emphasis added].‖40 If the Third 
Holy Saint was accepted as de facto ―successor‖ by a sufficient number of 
adherents of the Nirmal Kutia Johal, even if a minority disagreed, then 
that would be enough to make appropriate findings of fact and construe 
the documents accordingly. 
The Court of Appeal was invited to reject this approach on a number 
of bases, including whether the standpoint adopted by the judge, which 
purported to be objective, from the perspective of English law and without 
a view on Sikh doctrine or practice, was skewed in accepting that the 
Third Holy Saint could be de facto ―successor‖ without being de jure 
―successor‖ to the First Holy Saint in the eyes of the Sikh religion.41   
In Mummery LJ‘s view (giving the sole judgment, joined by Hooper 
and Pitchford LJJ), the decision in Buttes Gas and Oil v Hammer (No 3)
42
 
as sufficient authority for the proposition that, if a purportedly secular 
dispute on the construction of a deed in English law turned fundamentally 
on a dispute on religious doctrine, the absence of ―judicial or manageable 
standards by which to judge these issues‖ put the matter outside the 
jurisdiction of the courts.
43
 Contrary to the claimants‘ plea that there was a 
―bond of union‖ (a contract or agreement) between the parties that 
provided sufficient objective standards, this was a case where ―judicial 
self-restraint‖ was required, as the subject-matter of the religious dispute 
defied ―analysing evidence, or by finding facts on the balance of 
probability, or by counting heads, or by ascertaining the wishes of a 
voting majority.‖44 The deeds themselves did not provide any way to 
consider the meaning of ―successor‖ without delving into the religious 
dispute, ―essentially a matter of professed subjective belief and faith on 
which secular municipal courts cannot possibly reach a decision, either as 
a matter of law or fact….This court should put a halt to this case now.‖45 
 
                                                     
40
 Khaira v Shergill [2013] EWHC 4162 (Ch) [22] - [25] (HHJ Cooke).  
41
 See Mummery LJ in CA [51] – [56]. As the headnote put it, ‗it was not simply 
a question of the meaning of word ―successor‖, but whether [the Third Holy 
Saint] fitted that description‘.  
42
 [1982] AC 888, in which the House of Lords considered a claim for slander 
whose true goal was to obtain a decision of the English court about the boundary 
between the territory of three Gulf states, which affected the parties‘ off-shore 
drilling rights. 
43
 Shergill (n 39) [15], quoting Lord Wilberforce in Buttes 938B-C. 
44
 Ibid [16], [59], [70]–[71].  
45
 Ibid [72]–[73].  
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KHAIRA IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
The single judgment in the Supreme Court differed with Mummery 
LJ‘s understanding of Buttes Gas. That case was non-justiciable because it 
was inherently political and involved the transactions of foreign sovereign 
states: ―it trespassed on the proper province of the executive, as the organ 
of the state charged with the conduct of foreign relations‖, as well as the 
lack of ―judicial or manageable standards‖ as Mummery LJ identified, 
making it ―difficult to imagine that such a conclusion could have been 
reached in any other context than the policy acts of sovereign states, for 
the acts of private parties, however political, are subject to law.‖46 The 
implication here is that, although religious matters may fall under the 
second quality of political matters, they do not fall under the first, and 
thus there is no inherent non-justiciability in matters of religion.   
A case is non-justiciable ―where an issue is said to be inherently 
unsuitable for judicial determination by reason only of its subject matter‖, 
for two reasons.
47
 Firstly, there was a ―rare‖ class of disputes where the 
issue was beyond the ―constitutional competence assigned to the courts 
under our conception of the separation of powers‖, and once the 
―forbidden‖ area was identified, including certain transactions of foreign 
states and of proceedings in Parliament, the court could not adjudicate on 
matters within it, even if necessary to decide some other justiciable issue 
(if it ―inhibits the defence of a claim, this may make it necessary to strike 
out an otherwise justiciable claim on the ground that it cannot be fairly 
tried‖).48  
The court also proposed a second, ―quite different‖ basis for non-
justiciability: ―claims or defences which are based neither on private legal 
rights or obligations, nor on reviewable matters of public law‖, such as 
―domestic disputes, transactions not intended by the participants to affect 
their legal relations, and [certain] issues of international law.‖ Disputes in 
this category may, however, be entertained by ―reluctant‖ courts if a legal 
right is engaged.
 49
  
                                                     
46
 Ibid [40]. 
47
 Non-justiciability was juxtaposed to other matters, such as state immunity, the 
act of state doctrine, and unenforceability of foreign penal, revenue or public 
laws, which are ‗generally questions of territorial limits of the competence‘ of 
English courts or the competence the courts recognise in foreign courts: ibid [41]. 
48
 Ibid [42]. See Prebble v Television New Zealand [1995] 1 AC 321 and 
Hamilton v Al-Fayed [2001] 1 AC 395.  
49
 Ibid [43]; see the Lord Bingham quote from R (Gentle) v Prime Minister 
[2008] 1 AC 1356. 
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The Court cited a Canadian Supreme Court case, where a promise to 
obtain a Jewish religious divorce made by a husband to his wife was 
enforceable as a civil contract and was not merely a religious and moral 
obligation, in support of the proposition that the court is ―not barred from 
considering a question of a religious nature, provided that the claim is 
based on the violation of a rule recognized in positive law‖.50  
The Court set out the limited instances where this might happen. A 
line of English and Scots law cases show how ―where a claimant asks the 
court to enforce private rights and obligations which depend on religious 
issues, the judge may have to determine such religious issues as are 
capable of objective ascertainment.‖51 These include questions of religious 
belief and practice where the court‖s jurisdiction is invoked either (a) to 
enforce the contractual rights of members of a community against other 
members or its governing body, or (b) to ensure that property held on trust 
is used for the purposes of the trust.
52 
The Supreme Court also rejected two bases of non-justiciability of 
religious disputes. The first related to public law. The well-known 
decision in ex parte Wachmann, that the Chief Rabbi‘s decision that the 
applicant was not religiously and morally fit to hold office as a rabbi did 
not raise an issue of public law which was amenable to judicial review, 
was ―not an authority for a proposition that the legality of such 
disciplinary proceedings is not justiciable‖.53  
In Wachmann the court declined jurisdiction because the respondent 
was not a reviewable body, exercising functions ―essentially intimate, 
spiritual, and religious — functions which the government could not and 
would not seek to discharge in his place were he to abdicate his regulatory 
responsibility‖54, and the decision was not reviewable as to do so would 
―inevitably‖ draw the court into ―adjudicating upon matters intimate to a 
religious community‖.55  
                                                     
50
 Ibid [44].  
51
 Ibid [45].  
52
 Although today statutory provisions may ‗provide a means of avoiding the 
judicial determination of a religious dispute‘ in both jurisdictions: [56]. The 
authors of Religion and Law in the United Kingdom distinguish between courts 
intervening where there is a financial interest (the ‗Forbes v Eden principle‘: 
(1867) LR 1 Sc & Div 568) and where the disposal and administration of property 
is at stake: 78. 
53
 Shergill (n 39) [58].  
54
 R v Chief Rabbi of The United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and The 
Commonwealth ex parte Wachmann [1992] 1 WLR 1036, 1042.  
55
 Ibid 1043. 
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The implication in the Supreme Court‘s consideration of Wachmann is 
that it was the absence of any cause of action on the ―government 
function‖ test in public law that defeated the claim – the first reason given 
by Simon Brown J – and not the second, which alone would not have been 
enough to defeat a claim ―presented as a challenge to the contractual 
jurisdiction of a voluntary association‖, where the court had jurisdiction to 
consider questions of ultra vires and allegations of breaches of natural 
justice.
56
  
The second basis rejected by the Court was that found in the grounds 
of Blake, a former Anglican clergyman who purported to conduct a same-
sex marriage on a TV programme.  
Two pieces in the Daily Mail commented on the programme and 
described him variously as a ―self-styled‖ and ―imitation‖ bishop with a 
―costume mitre‖.57 In his claim for libel, Mr Blake pleaded that the 
articles alleged he was not validly consecrated nor entitled to call himself 
a bishop, although he ―masqueraded‖ as one, and that he was ―publicly 
and dishonestly‖ imitating a bishop, thereby setting out to deceive the 
public.
58
  
The publishers of the Mail disagreed with the precise meanings borne 
by the articles, but pleaded that ―in all the circumstances C is an imitation 
bishop‖. It sought to defend the articles using the defences of justification 
and/or fair comment.
59
  
After the exchange of pleadings and witness statements - the 
statements of the claimant and his witnesses were ―redolent with 
doctrinal, procedural, jurisdictional and historical arguments in favour of 
validity of his consecration‖60 - the judge decided that the pleaded issues 
were within the ―territory which the courts, by self-denying ordinance, 
will not enter‖.61  
Gray J then moved on to consider whether the action should be stayed 
or proceed to trial, with perhaps some ―adaptation of the issues as they 
stand at present‖.62 The claimant argued that underlying the doctrinal issue 
as to the validity of his consecration was a ―secular issue‖ that could be 
                                                     
56
 The reasoning in Wachmann has been described as ‗suspect on several counts, 
not least since the test for judicial review is the present of ―public‖ functions not 
―governmental‖‘: Doe, Religion and Law in the United Kingdom (n 2) 79. 
57
 Blake (n 3) [1] – [10]. 
58
 Ibid [11]. 
59
 Ibid [12]-[13]. 
60
 Ibid [17]. 
61
 Ibid [24].  
62
 Ibid [25].  
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appropriately determined by the courts: whether the claimant had ―in 
historical fact‖ been consecrated as a bishop.63 The claimant‘s expert 
opined that the claimant had been ―clearly‖ consecrated a matter of 
historical fact, and that this was within ―a valid historical succession‖, 
albeit one that may not be recognised by other churches. The complained 
of articles wholly neglected this context, generating the misleading 
impression he was an impostor.
64
 The defendant countered that non-
justiciable religious issues were so ―fundamental‖ that the action could not 
be fairly tried.
65
 
Gray J, who acknowledged that a stay should only be granted in most 
extreme circumstances as it would deny the claimant the opportunity of 
establishing good name in the courts, concluded that the issues in the 
action could not be adapted to ―circumvent the insuperable obstacle 
placed in the way of a fair trial‖.66 He suggested that the claimant, who he 
found ―understandably somewhat reluctant to abandon his claim to have 
been validly consecrated‖, should make a ―modified version of the secular 
issue‖ the basis of the claim, before noting the sheer quantity and depth of 
issues in the case that came within the ―forbidden‖ territory of non-
justiciability:  
 
―Such questions include, by way of example only, substantive 
doctrinal questions including the canon law of catholic apostolic 
churches, questions of ecclesiastic procedure such as the authority 
and entitlement of Richard Palmer to consecrate the Claimant and 
the validity (in the absence at the time of any denomination or 
established church) of the consecration of the Claimant; questions 
whether the consecration of the Claimant was in conformity with 
the customs and practices of any established Christian 
denomination or criteria independently of POEM [the claimant‘s 
order] and finally questions as to the moral standing and fitness of 
both Richard Palmer and the Claimant for episcopal office.‖67 
 
THE IMPACT OF KHAIRA ON DEFAMATION CASES 
 
The Court does not explain precisely why the decision in Blake was 
incorrect; the thrust of its criticism is that, because a private right was 
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engaged, the claim should have proceeded to trial, even if that required the 
determination of religious doctrine, in order to give legal effect to the 
claimant‘s private rights. This is indicated by the fact that the Court was 
happy to remit a number of difficult questions about the dispute back for 
trial by the lower courts, including on the fundamental tenets of the First 
Holy Saint and the Nirmal sect, the nature of the institution at Nirmal 
Kutia in India, the steps or formalities were needed for a person to become 
the successor of the First Holy Saint, and whether the teachings and 
personal qualities of the Third Holy Saint comply with the fundamental 
religious aims and purposes of the trust.
68
 
On this basis, the Court could have criticised other recent decisions 
applying the ―fundamental and inseparable‖ test to religious doctrine. 
Similar matters arose in the parallel defamation proceedings in Baba Jeet 
v Singh and Shergill v Purewal. In Baba Jeet, the Third Holy Saint 
claimed that an article in the Sikh Times about the Nirmal Sikh faith 
damaged his reputation in the UK as it alleged he was the leader of a 
―cult‖ and an impostor who disturbed the peace in the Sikh community 
generally and in High Wycombe specifically, had dishonestly produced 
counterfeit trust deeds to remove the gurdwara trustees and management 
committee there, and promoted blasphemy and the sexual exploitation and 
abuse of women.
69
 In Purewal, the first claimant in Khaira brought a libel 
action against another Sikh newspaper, the Punjab Times, and a journalist 
for three articles that attacked the Third Holy Saint and his followers, 
including some of the trustee appointees. The articles claimed that the 
Third Holy Saint had abandoned Sikh principles, that he and his 
supporters were a ―sham‖, and that the claimant had sought to instigate 
violence.
70
 
Both actions were stayed at preliminary issues hearings because issues 
of religion and doctrine permeated the pleadings and the courts did not 
consider it within their jurisdiction to determine the religious questions. 
For instance, the issue in Baba Jeet of whether the claimant was an 
―impostor‖ could not be isolated and resolved without reference to Sikh 
doctrines and traditions
71
, and the issues in Purewal, such as whether the 
Third Holy Saint was the legitimate successor to the sainthood, were 
                                                     
68
 Khaira [59].  
69
 Baba Jeet [8].  
70
 Purewal [1]-[8]. 
71
 Baba Jeet [41] (Eady J) following the reasoning in Blake (n 3). The Third Holy 
Saint successfully obtained permission to appeal but a substantive appeal not 
heard as he failed to pay security for costs: His Holiness Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji 
Maharaj v Eastern Media Group and Anr [2011] EWCA Civ 139. 
THE PROBLEM OF THE NON-JUSTICIABILITY OF RELIGIOUS 
DEFAMATIONS 
 
254 
―fundamental‖ to the case, making it ―impossible to adapt the issues in 
such a way as to circumvent the insuperable obstacle placed in the way of 
a fair trial of the action by the fact that the court is bound to abstain from 
determining questions which lie at the heart of the case‖.72 Applying 
Khaira, it is likely that both cases should have gone to trial given the 
engagement of the claimants‘ private law rights. Nothing distinguishes 
either from Blake.  
It seems that the Supreme Court has subverted the basis for these 
decisions. Being founded on a religious dispute does not disqualify a legal 
dispute as non-justiciable per se, whether or not the claim can be reframed 
in secular terms (it does if it is purely a religious dispute, however). The 
Court has preferred the claimant‘s right to vindication of reputation over 
the defendant‘s rights in the action, against authority in a line of cases 
such as Prebble, Hamilton and Greer v Hencke
73
, and Blake: ―the 
newspaper would still wish to advance the case that the consecration 
service had no religious or ecclesiastic validity, so that it was in effect a 
charade, and that to prevent the newspaper from advancing this case 
would be manifestly unfair and a serious invasion of its Article 10 
right‖.74  
Furthermore, the Court, through its support for Lord Davey‘s 
prohibition in Overtoun, appears not to permit courts to decide the ―truth‖ 
of religious doctrines.
75
 It seems doubly unfair on the defendant if 
defamation claims underlain by religious disputes are justiciable but the 
truth of the religious dispute cannot be contemplated in its own terms nor 
repleaded in wholly non-doctrinal ones.  
A solution (or at least a ―preferable means of accommodating religion 
in the law of libel‖76) may lie in the reformulation of the defence of honest 
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opinion. The Supreme Court alluded to the previous formulation of the 
defence in Spiller v Joseph in Khaira.
77
 Currently, under s 3, a ―fact‖ for 
the purposes of the defence must be something the defendant can prove is 
true. This does not get the religious doctrine dispute any further than the 
defence of justification. But if ―fact‖ for the purposes of honest opinion 
meant the allusion to or representation of the religious doctrine dispute 
itself, this would form the basis of the defence provided the other 
conditions in the defence are satisfied.  
This would not give the defendant the same protection as a strike-out 
of the claim on the basis of non-justiciability, described as ―an absolute 
privilege which has never been recognised and could easily be abused‖78, 
but it would provide critics and commentators with a safer defence 
provided they refer to the doctrinal dispute in their publication. It would, 
in effect, extended the concept of privilege, already acknowledged in the 
honest opinion defence, beyond its established domains of absolute and 
qualified privilege, and rebalance the scales of justice between the parties 
in religious defamation disputes.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Khaira does more than ―shift…the boundary slightly and enlarge the 
circumstances in which the court will feel able to intervene‖79 or merely 
―push the door of non-justiciability open by a crack‖.80  It potentially 
heralds a return to what has been described as the ―nineteenth century‖ 
concept of non-justiciability, where judges sought ―neutrality‖ and 
detachedness by ―pointing out that it was no role of a court of law to act as 
a religious insider delivering ―correct‖ answers to the underlying 
substantive theological or ecclesiological dispute between the parties‖ but 
would ―regularly proceed to point out that questions of doctrine and 
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discipline might well be relevant as questions of fact to determine the 
outcome of the case‖ through the use of evidence.81  
Particularly given the willingness of courts to widen the legal 
definition of a religion, for instance to the Church of Scientology,
82
 it is 
hard to disagree with Singh that there is likely to be a rise in defamation 
cases involving religion, more of which will be deemed justiciable.
83
 
There has even been an attempt at a private prosecution on the basis of the 
―untruth‖ of the Mormon faith.84 More cases will involve religions other 
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than Christianity, as new religious movements (NRMs) use threats of libel 
to silence critics.
85
  
Nonetheless, these cases will demand resolution by the courts: 
whereas the property law cases cited by the Supreme Court were 
potentially open to alternative dispute resolution (such as mediation) 
where all parties could be partially satisfied through the division of the 
trust property amongst them, in defamation cases such division is not 
possible: either the claimant vindicates their reputation, or the libel stands. 
There is no halfway house. Damage to reputation is not easily repaired 
nor, in the eyes of many claimants, adequately restored by damages. Many 
will welcome the decision in Khaira.  
At the same time, most of the occasions on which the courts have 
decided religious truths as the basis for enforcing secular rights and 
obligations have concerned underlying Christian theology. Given the 
composition of the judiciary it is reasonable to infer that most judges will 
be much more familiar with Christian doctrine and practice than with 
Hinduism or Islam. The invitation in Khaira could thus herald an 
avalanche of defamation claims in a range of familiar religions and 
NRMs. This would possibly be counter-cultural given the cultural and 
political shift towards defences of free speech, perhaps seen more 
glaringly after the Charlie Hebdo killings. 
The Magna Carta ends with a peroration at article 63: 
 
―IT IS ACCORDINGLY OUR WISH AND COMMAND that the 
English Church shall be free, and that men in our kingdom shall 
have and keep all these liberties, rights, and concessions, well and 
peaceably in their fullness and entirety for them and their heirs, of 
us and our heirs, in all things and all places for ever.‖ 
 
Such a pronouncement was satisfactory for the relative cultural 
homogeneity of the thirteenth century. 800 years later, it is the balance 
between the liberty of the churches in their doctrines, and the right of 
reputation of ―men in our kingdom‖, that is at stake today.  
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